Tiêu đề Rabuya - Property.pdf ✅

1 1 BOOK II PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATION Title I. CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS ARTICLE 414. All things which are or may be the object of appro- priation are considered either: (1) Immovable or real property; or (2) Movable or personal property. (333) § 1. Introductory Concepts [1.1] Origin of the Word “Property” The word “property” is derived from the Latin word proprius, meaning belonging to one or one’s own.1 Traditionally, therefore, the concept of property extends only to those things which are already possessed and found in the possession of man.2 Hence, in the traditional notion, the concept of property is inseparable from the relation which the object has with the person exercising dominion or right over it. It is in this sense that the concept of property is said to be limited compared to the concept of things, which extends to all objects that exist,3 whether it is already in the possession of man or not. 1 Miss. — Thompson v. Kreutzer, 72 So. 891, 112 Miss. 165. 2 2 Falcon 6, 3 Manresa 10, cited in II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 ed., 2. 3 II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 ed., 2.
2 PROPERTY [1.2] Concept of “Things” The concept of “property” (bienes) is intimately related with the concept of “things” (cosa). It must be noticed that the Civil Code does not defi ne the term property but simply implies that the concept refers to things which are susceptible of appropriation.4 With the foregoing in mind, it is but proper to begin the discussion of property with the concept of “things.” There was a time in history when certain persons, called “slaves,” were considered merely as chattels or things that could be the subject of appropriation. But as human civilization progressed, the practice of slavery has been condemned and eventually eradicated. In the modern world, therefore, distinction is made between persons and things. The former is regarded as the subject or the holder of rights while the latter is its object, although the actions of the former may likewise be the object of rights. Thus, while the human person may not be considered as property, his conduct or acts, to a certain extent, may give rise to enforceable rights in favor of other persons if such act or conduct is considered by law as a source of obligation. Things, therefore, are objects external to man. But the concept of things under the Civil Code is not limited to corporeal objects — or to objects that can be perceived by the senses. The concept also extends to those which have only an intellectual or juridical existence (incorporeal objects). Otherwise stated, the concept of things in our Civil Code embraces both material objects and rights. This is clear from the provisions of Articles 414, 415 and 416 of the New Civil Code. To illustrate, in Article 414, the law considers all things susceptible of appropriation as property, which may either be real or personal. In Articles 415 and 416, on the other hand, rights are likewise considered as property. This is exemplifi ed in the provision of paragraph 10 of Article 415 which classifi es as real property those “real rights over immovable property” and in the provision of paragraph 1 of Article 417 of the New Civil Code which classifi es as personal property “obligations and actions which have for their object movables or demandable sums.” 4 See Art. 414, NCC.
3 [1.3] Concept of “Property” under the Civil Code As discussed in supra § 1.1, the traditional notion is that property are those things which are already possessed and found in the possession of man. However, in our Civil Code, the concept of property is not confi ned to things which are already appropriated or possessed by man but also extends to those susceptible of such appropriation, although not yet appropriated. This is clear from the provisions of Article 414 which classifi es as property “all things which are or may be the object of appropriation.” From the viewpoint of the Code, therefore, the terms “property” and “things” are identical to each other and may be used interchangeably.5 [1.4] Susceptibility to Appropriation As mentioned in supra § 1.2, the term “property” under the Civil Code refers to things which are susceptible of appropriation. Hence, even in the juridical sense, not all things may be considered as property. This much is clear from the very provision of Article 414 of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to said article, it is essential that a thing must be susceptible of appropriation before it can be considered as property. Things which cannot, therefore, be subjected to human control by reason of sheer physical impossibility are not considered as property. Examples are the following: (1) Things which, because of their distance, their depth or their immensity are not capable of human control such as the sun, the stars and the ocean, are not properties; (2) Ordinarily, forces of nature such as lightning and rain are not properties because of impossibility of appropriation in their diffused state. However, when they are brought under human control through the help of science, i.e., electricity, they may now be regarded as property.6 For the purpose of classifying things as property, the criterion of susceptibility to appropriation should be distinguished from the concept of things or objects which are “outside the commerce of man.” While things which are outside the commerce of man may not be the object of 5 See II Caguioa, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1966 ed., 3. 6 See Art. 416(3), NCC. PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATION CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY Preliminary Provisions
4 PROPERTY a contract,7 they are not necessarily disqualifi ed from being considered as property pursuant to the criterion mentioned in Article 414 of the Code. For example, properties of public dominion pertaining to the State, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the object of contracts. However, they are considered property under the Code.8 [1.5] Additional Requisites Aside from the criterion of susceptibility to appropriation mentioned in Article 414, most authors in the subject provide for two additional requisites before considering a thing as property: (1) utility, or that it can serve as a means to satisfy human needs; and (2) substantivity or individuality, or that the thing must have an autonomous and separate existence. With respect to the requisite of utility, it is inconceivable at this age to think of a thing which is incapable of satisfying any human need or want. As such, this requirement is of little use in law because almost all things are capable of giving utility to man. The requisite of individuality, on the other hand, need not be spelled out separately for the same is implicitly required in Article 414 of the Code. Thus, to be considered a separate property, a thing must have an autonomous and separate existence and not simply a part of a whole. But if a part is separated from the whole and, while in that state, is capable of satisfying any human need or want, it can then be considered as a separate property. This is the basis, for example, of the rule stated in Article 466 of the New Civil Code which states that “whenever two movable things belonging to different owners are, without bad faith, united in such a way that they form a single object, the owner of the principal thing acquires the accessory, indemnifying the former owner thereof for its value.” Hence, when a diamond stone is attached to a ring, the ring and the stone constitute a single property since they now form a single object. However, when the stone is removed from the ring it will be regarded as a separate property from the ring to which it has once been attached. 7 See Art. 1347, NCC. 8 See Arts. 419 to 425, NCC.