Title B 133.904_Garth L. Hallett-A Middle Way to God-Oxford University Press (2000).pdf ✅

cover next page > title: A Middle Way to God author: Hallett, Garth. publisher: Oxford University Press isbn10 | asin: 0195132688 print isbn13: 9780195132687 ebook isbn13: 9780585365688 language: English subject God--Proof, Other minds (Theory of knowledge) publication date: 2000 lcc: BT102.H336 2000eb ddc: 231/.042 subject: God--Proof, Other minds (Theory of knowledge) cover next page >
< previous page page_iii next page > Page iii A Middle Way to God Garth L. Hallett < previous page page_iii next page >
< previous page page_iv next page > Page iv Oxford New York Athens Auchland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris São Paulo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 2000 by Garth L. Hallett Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitte, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hallett, Garth. A middle way to God / Garth L. Hallett. p. cm. Included bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-513268-8 1. GodProof. 2. Other minds (Theory of knowledge) I. Title. BT102.H336 2000 2319.042dc21 99-21008 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper < previous page page_iv next page >
< previous page page_v next page > Page v Preface In modern times, one epistemological straitjacket has followed another. Judged by the mathematical standards that Descartes and others espoused, belief in God's existence does not qualify as knowledge, but neither do scientific beliefs. Judged by the scientific standards that later rose to dominance, belief in God does not even qualify as rational, but neither do basic convictions such as belief in the physical world or belief in other minds. Today, despite repeated failures, the search for precise criteria of knowledge and of rational belief continues. For without such criteria how are we to evaluate belief in God or in anything else? My early thinking, influenced by Wittgenstein, took a different turn. Comparisons, I thought, might replace precise criteria. Thus, if basic nonscientific beliefs count against criteria that exclude them, rather than vice versa, they also count for beliefs that resemble them. Moreover, the closer the resemblance, the stronger the support. So, rather than test belief in God by unsuitable standards, why not compare this belief with the generally recognized basic belief that most nearly resembles itnamely, belief in other mindsand scrutinize their resemblance more closely? Why not write a book entitled God and Other Minds? When Alvin Plantinga published an admirable study on the same topic, with the same title, I abandoned my idea. Now, three decades later, I have returned to it. Subsequent reflection and the dialectic of debate have done nothing to lessen the interest of the comparison Plantinga undertook, but they have made clear how differently the comparison needs to be conducted. Hence, despite its similar focus, the present study differs from Plantinga'sindeed differs greatlyin its method, structure, and contents. The difference in methodmore exploratory, less demonstrativealso permits a more accessible style of discussion, aimed at a somewhat broader audience. I realize that my theme merits a more perceptive treatment than I am likely to achieve, for what question is more important than that of God's existence, and what issue is more complex? Fortunately, I have not been left entirely to my own inadequate < previous page page_v next page >