Title Alexander L. Vuving (2023) The Evolution of Vietnamese Foreign Policy in the “Doi Moi” Era.pdf ✅

Vietnam Navigating a Rapidly Changing Economy, Society, and Political Order Edited by Börje Ljunggren and Dwight H. Perkins Published by the Harvard University Asia Center Distributed by Harvard University Press Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London 2023 Copyright 2023 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Do not reproduce.


The Evolution of Vietnamese Foreign Policy 349 because it saw opportunities to extract rent in these processes. The dominance of this policy current has transformed the neo-Stalinist state into a rent-seeking one that retained many Leninist practices and institutions due to their usefulness. Marxist-Leninist ideology served as a fig leaf to cover the embarrassing rent-seeking nature. Starting in 2014, the rent- seeking state has been on a correction course as rent-seeking was rivaled by moderation, the policy current of the middle of the road between modernization and regime survival- ism, the previous incarnation of which was anti-Westernism. Events in Vietnam’s relations with China and the United States in 2014 were the last push to morph anti-Westernism into regime survivalism, which accepted the Western-led international order while endeav- oring to preserve Communist Party rule in Vietnam. Thus, by the latter half of the 2010s, all major Vietnamese policy currents shared the integrationist worldview, although each strove to anchor Vietnam to a dif­ferent place in the world. For modernizers, the ideal place was an advantageous position to compete in the world market; for rent-seekers, it was a comfortable place to collect rents; for regime survivalists, it was a secure abode to main- tain Communist Party rule. Throughout the doi moi era, Vietnamese politics evolved from a neo-Stalinist state into a rent-seeking state, both employing the Leninist regime, but the trajectory was far from linear. The following four sections will each examine a phase in the evolution of Vietnam- ese politics since the mid-1980s. The concluding section will briefly address the key chal- lenges and potentials for change lying ahead for Vietnamese foreign policy. A Neo-Stalinist State in Reform, 1986–89 In the mid-1980s, a prolonged economic crisis and near-famines that started in the late 1970s, coupled with two concurrent wars of attrition—military conflicts with China along the northern border and a counterinsurgency war in Cambodia—and the diplomatic isola- tion resulting from the military intervention in Cambodia, forced Vietnam’s ruling elite to adopt large-scale reform. After trying dif­ferent directions of economic reform since 1979, the CPV announced a comprehensive reform program at its Sixth Congress in Decem- ber 1986 and, in the spirit of “renovate or die” (đổi mới hay là chết), declared “renovation” as a grand cause of the Party. This partial but large break with the past was accelerated by the election of Truong Chinh, who had turned from a conservative to a reformer during 1983–86, as Party chief to replace the deceased Le Duan in July 1986.2 Vietnam’s severe economic crisis was part of a systemic governance and economic impasse that haunted the Communist countries. Responding to this predicament, newly elected Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introduced a radical reform program, commonly known as perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness, transparency), announced at the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1986. As the Soviet Union was financing a large part of Vietnam’s government budget through massive eco- nomic and military aid, the new Soviet policy exerted a strong pressure for reform in Viet- nam. At the same time, “new thinking” (новое мышление, novoe myshlenie), the ideology Copyright 2023 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Do not reproduce.